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BAR BRIEFS
The members of the Executive Board of the various Judicial
Districts are now laying plans for the raising of such funds. May
! urge your cooperation in their efforts. Conditions in our State
at the present time are good and I am sure that each member of
the Bar will be willing to participate in this fund.
The Executive Board will meet again at Minot on November
23rd. If the response is prompt and generous we shall set up our
budget and put the machinery in motion for our activities for the
coming year.
We hope to have your whole hearted cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
H. A. MACKOFF
President
SIXTH DISTRICT MEETING
The meeting of the District Bar of the Sixth Judicial District
will be held in Dickinson on November 16th, 1946, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m. at the Villard Hotel.
The Sectional Assembly topic of "Bringing Actions to Quiet
Title under the North Dakota Statute" will be discussed. Judge
Leo. F. Broderick will lead the discussion, and Judges Harvey J.
Miller and J. 0. Wigen will also participate. A banquet for the
members and their ladies will following the business meeting.
Every member who plans on attending this meeting is urged to
write to Mr. Theo. Kellogg at Dickinson, giving the number of
reservations for the banquet.
NOTICE OF ELECTION TO STATE BAR BOARD
The Executive Committee has nominated Geo. F. Shafer, and
Gordon V. Cox, both of Bismarck, N. D., for the State Bar Board
to fill the term of Geo. F. Shafer expiring December 31st, 1946.
Attorneys may make additional nominations by a petition
signed by ten members, and filed with the secretary on or before
December 1st, 1946.
AWARD OF ALIMONY SUBSEQUENT TO A DECREE OF
DIVORCE
By
WILLIAM H. CONLEE
(April 1946 Issue of Current Legal Thought)
The general rule is that where the decree of absolute divorce,
without provision for alimony, has been entered, a subsequent ac-
tion for alimony cannot be instituted. However, perplexing prob-
lems often arise wherein the courts are asked to relax the general
rule stated above.
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First; there are cases in which a divorce decree is obtained
and alimony is not asked although there has been personal service
on the defendant husband within the jurisdiction of the court. It
is held generally that alimony will not be awarded thereafter.
Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa 249, 158 N. W. 529. (1916); Hebert v.
Hebert, 221 Mo. App. 201, 299 S. W. 840 (1927). If the decree of
divorce specifically reserves the question of alimony for later ad-
judication, or if it can be shown that the omission of the reserva-
tion of the right to later adjudicate the question of alimony was
due to the perpetration of a fraud on the part of the husband, the
case may be reopened. In Hank v. Hanks, 282 Ky. 236, 138 S. W.
(2d) 362 (1940), it is interesting, to note that subsequent to the
divorce decree in which alimony was neither asked nor awarded,
the wife was allowed to seek alimony through a counter-claim to a
petition by the husband for the return of property deeded to the
wife during the marriage. Apparently such a situation would not
arise except in a suit for the restitution of property deeded by the
husband to the wife as a result of the marriage relationship as
provided by the Kentucky Code. (Carroll, 1938) See. 425. The
above case was cited as an exception to the general rule in Ken-
tucky, by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case
of In Re Potts, 142 F. (2d) 883, 890 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944. The few
jurisdictions permitting an action for alimony by the wife after
the decree of divorce has been entered, irrespective of whether or
not the decree reserved the question of alimony for future ad-
judication, do so under the authority of a statute. Noel v. Noel, 15
N. J. Misc. 716. 193 Atl. 558 (1937).
Second; there are cases in which a divorce is obtained by the
wife on constructive service of process in state A and later the de-
fendant comes within the jurisdiction of the court state A and is
personally served in a subsequent action for alimony. Under this
situation the majority of the courts hold that a subsequent suit
for alimony cannot be instituted by the wife. Doekson v. Doekson,
202 Iowa 489, 210 N. W. 545 (1926); Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn.
287, 277 S. W. 894 (1925.) There is, however, a strong minority
view that a subsequent suit for alimony can be maintained if per-
sonal service within the jurisdiction can be had upon the defend-
ant husband. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 54, Ohio App. 2396 N. E.
(2d) 1005 (1936) ;Hutton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 Pac. 165
(1921) ; (Statutory provision). Likewise, some jurisdictions allow
a suit for alimony under these circumstances if the question of
alimony was reserved for later adjudication. Karcher v. Karcher,
204 Ill. App. 210 (1917).
Third; there are also cases in which a divorce is obtained
by the husband on constructive service of process in state A and
the wife later comes within the jurisdiction of the court in state A
and institutes a subsequent suit for alimony with personal service
upon the husband in state A. A subsequent action for alimony will
be allowed in this type of case if it can be shown that the husband
perpetrated a fraud upon the court in securing the divorce. Hon-
aker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S. W. 42 (1927) ; Cralle v. Cralle,
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79 Va. 182 (1884). Generally the courts will not avoid the decree of
divorce already granted but will permit the reopening of the case
for the purpose of determining the question of alimony only.
Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S. W. 42 (1927). However,
the Virginia Court, by way of dictum,, indicated that it might be
possible for the prior decree of divorce to be set aside and in a sub-
sequent suit by the wife the question of divorce as well as alimony
might be adjudicated. See Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 182 at 187
(1884).
Fourth; there are also cases in which the matrimonial domicle
is in state A and the wife goes to state B and obtains a divorce,
with constructive service of process upon the defendant husband
in the suit for divorce in state B,and in which the wife returns to
state A and institutes a subsequent action for alimony, obtaining
personal service upon the husband in state A. This situation is
governed by the general rule, which forbids a subsequent action
for alimony in the majority of the jurisdictions. However some
jurisdictions allow a subsequent action, if the decree of divorce re-
served the question of alimony for future adjudication in a state in
which personal service could be had upon the defendant husband.
Darnell v. Darnell. 212 11. App. 601 (1918); Woods v. Waddle, 44
Ohio State 449, 8 N. E. 297 (1886).
Fifth; there are cases in which the matrimonial domicile is in
state A and the husband goes to state B and obtains a divorce
with constructive service of process upon the wife, and he then re-
turns to state A and the wife institutes an action for alimony, with
personal service upon the husband. The majority of the jurisdic-
tions permit the wife to institute a subsequent action for alimony
when personal service can be had upon the husband upon his re-
turn to the matrimonial domicile. Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197
Pac. 241 (1921); Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn. 385, 168 N. W. 135
(1918).Since the action for alimony is in personam although the
action for divorce is in rem, the alimony decree requires personal
service whereas the divorce decree may be had upon constructive
service. Therefore it may seem that unless the court allow the
wife to institute the subsequent action, she would be unable to pro-
secute her right to maintenance. The minority view which does
not permit the wife to prosecute the subsequent action for alimony
refuses it upon the ground that the divorce decree destroyed the
marital relationship upon which the subsequent action for alimony
must be based. Shaw v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 722; 61 N. W. 368 (1894).
In conclusion it is believed that the majority of the jurisdictions
reach a logical result in adhering to the general rule and refusing
to allow a subsequent suit for alimony after a final decree of di-
vorce has been entered, in the first, third, and fourth situations;
and by permitting the subsequent action in the fifth situation.
However, the exceptions which are allowed are based upon justice.
The majority rule governing the second situation which denies the
wife the right to reopen the decree of divorce for the question of
alimony where she has obtained a divorce with constructive service
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of process in the matrimonial domicile and thereafter the husband
returns to the jurisdiction is not supportable. The husband may
give the wife ample grounds for divorce but may escape his re-
sponsibilities by the simple expedient of "skipping out," crossing
the state line and keeping himself absent for a short period. By
this procedure he has prevented an admittedly wronged wife from
securing her legal right to support. It is fortunate that a strong
and rapidly growing minority is working to correct this situation.
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